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Recent Cases
ANTITRUST - PARENS PATRIAE - STATE RECOVERY
OF MONEY DAMAGES
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted,
401 U.S. 936 (1971).
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recently held,
in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,1 that a state may not maintain an
antitrust treble damage action under section 4 of the Clayton Act,
for injuries to its general economy. The State of Hawaii, suing un-
der a theory of parens patriae, charged that the defendants3 had con-
spired to fix the price of gasoline and asphalt in Hawaii,4 thus in-
juring its general economy.5 Hawaii sought recovery on two counts:
(1) that the state's proprietary capacity had been injured,' and (2)
that as parens patriae of its citizens, Hawaii was entitled to treble
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act and to injunctive relief.
Standard Oil's motion to have the second count dismissed was denied
by the district court,7 but the court of appeals reversed, stating: "We
1431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 936 (1971).
2 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). Section 4 provides in part: "Any person who shall be in-
jured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained...."
8 The defendants were Standard Oil Company of California, Union Oil Company of
California, Shell Oil Company, and Chevron Asphalt Company.
4 Price fixing is a restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Anti.
trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940).
5 Hawaii alleged the following injuries in its complaint:
(a) revenues of its citizens have been wrongfully extracted from [the economy
of] the State of Hawaii; (b) taxes affecting the citizens and commercial entities
have been increased to [offset) such losses of revenues and income; (c) oppor-
tunity in manufacturing, shipping and commerce have been restricted and cur-
tailed; (d) the full and complete utilization of the natural wealth of the State
has been prevented; (e) the high cost of manufacture in Hawaii has precluded
goods made there from equal competitive access with those of other States to
the national market; (f) measures taken by the State to promote the general
progress and welfare of its people have been frustrated; (g) the Hawaii econ-
omy has been held in a state of arrested development. 431 F.2d at 1283 n.2
(bracketed language included by court).
6 The court was not concerned with this count on appeal. See Georgia v. Evans, 316
U.S. 159 (1942).
7 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982, 988 (D. Hawaii 1969), rev'd, 431
F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 936 (1971).
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hold only that damages for injury done to the general economy of a
state are not recoverable by the state under § 4 of the Clayton Act."'
States have been using the parens patriae theory for the past 50
years to obtain injunctive relief when their quasi-sovereign inter-
ests have been endangered.9 But although historically parens pa-
triae had been used exclusively to obtain equitable relief,"° in 1945,
in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.,11 the Supreme Court indicated that
a state could use a parens patriae theory to recover damages result-
ing from an antitrust violation. In that case, Georgia brought a
parens patriae action against 20 railroads, charging them with freight
rate discrimination. The Supreme Court stated that not only did
Georgia's complaint state a cause of action for injury to her proprie-
tary interests, but also that "[t]here is no apparent reason why
[parens patriae1 suits should be excluded from the purview of the
anti-trust acts.' ' 2  The Court found, however, that because the freight
rates had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
they were "legal,"' 3 and thus Georgia could not collect damages. 4
The district court in the Hawaii case strongly relied on the
Georgia decision for the proposition that a state can properly main-
tain a treble damage suit under section 4 in its parens patriae capac-
ity.'5 The court of appeals, however, distinguished Georgia on the
grounds that Georgia involved section 16 of the Clayton Act.16 The
court pointed out that the injunctive relief envisaged by section 16
is different than the monetary relief provided by section 4. Further-
more, the court emphasized that section 16 is much broader than
section 4. Under section 16, any person is "entitled to sue for and
8431 F.2d at 1284.
9 See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
10 See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (equitable relief
obtained to stop pollution from a smelting plant); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907) (equitable relief appropriate to protect a state's water rights).
11 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
121d. at 447.
13 See Keogh v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
14 The case was remanded to a special master to determine what relief should be
granted. At that proceeding, Georgia failed to show that an injury to its economy had
occurred and the case was dismissed. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 340 U.S. 889(1950).
15301 F. Supp. at 987. This reading of the Georgia case has been critidzed. See
Malina & Blechman, Parens Patriae suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws,
65 Nw. U.L. REv. 193 (1970), The authors of the above article noted that "[w~ith no
[parens patriae] treble damage claim before the Court, the Georgia opinion can scarcely
stand as approving authority for the novel assertion presented by Hawaii and accepted by
Judge Pence." Id. at 220.
16 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
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have injunctive relief . . . [when] threatened [with] loss or dam-
age by a violation of the antitrust laws . ". ..- On the other
hand, under section 4, a person must be injured in his business oi
property before he can recover treble damages.
After distinguishing the Georgia case, the court of appeals de-
cided that because of Hawaii's inability to specify a "precise theory
or measure" of damages,' it was doubtful whether there really was
an independent injury9 to its general economy. The court felt that
the general economy of a state is an abstraction which "exists only as
a reflection of the business or property values it represents."20  For
the sake of argument, however, the court assumed that the general
economy of a state could suffer antitrust injuries that were indepen-
dent of any injuries suffered by private individuals or by the state it-
self in its proprietary capacity. The court then held that for two
closely related reasons Hawaii could not use section 4 of the Clayton
Act to recover money damages for injuries to the state's economy.
The court first pointed out that the words "business or property" in
section 4 cannot include "all manner of damage felt by a commu-
nity."2 The court was unwilling to expand the traditional common
law usage of "business or property" in such a manner that the "gen-
eral economy of a region [could] be regarded as property in pos-
session of the residents individually or publicly." - 2 The court's second
reason for denying recovery was that any injury to the general econo-
my would have been too indirect and consequential to be recoverable
under the Clayton Act.2 3
The difficulty any state will have in proving and quantifying
legal damage to its general economy as a direct result of an anti-
trust violation is graphically shown by Hawaii's failure to even at-
tempt to estimate quantitative damages to its general economy.24 Be-
fore a state could recover damages for an injury to its general econ-
17 Id.
1 8 Hawaii stated in its complaint: "Plaintiff has not yet ascertained the precise extent
of said damage to itself and its citizens; however, when such amount has been ascer-
tained, plaintiff will ask leave of Court to insert said sum herein." 431 F.2d at 1283.
19 be able to bring a parens patriae action, "the State must show a direct interest
of its own and not merely seek recovery for the benefit of individuals who are the real
parties in interest." Oklahoma v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 396 (1938) (state could not en-
force claims of state bank's creditors and depositors). See also Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 598 (1923).
20 431 F.2d at 1285.
211d.
22 Id.
23 See Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955).
24 See note 18 supra.
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omy resulting from price fixing, it would have to show "more than
a shift of resources from one sector of its economy to another sector
of the same economy."' 25 Even though economists can show a the-
oretical loss of tax revenues resulting from price fixing,26 this does
not necessarily establish a harm to the state's general economy. For
example, lower gasoline sales tax revenues, resulting from a decrease
in consumption of overpriced gas, could be compensated for by
higher corporate income tax revenues. Also, even wrongfully pro-
cured capital does not necessarily harm the state if it remains within
the state's general economy2 7 Possibly by showing that companies
were deterred from locating in 'Hawaii because of the higher price
of gasoline and that this in turn caused reduced wages and a slower
economic growth, Hawaii could establish a basis for computing
money damages resulting from an injury to its economy."' But even
though price fixing may raise the cost of particular goods in the
state and thus deter potential investors, it is not a matter of inexor-
able economic theory that the state's economic growth will conse-
quently be retarded. "To the contrary, inflation is often accom-
panied by increased economic activity."129
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear the Hawaii0 case, and
hopefully the issue of parens patriae treble damage actions under
section 4 will soon be resolved. If the Court decides that such an
action can be brought, the states may become an important element
in the enforcement of the antitrust laws."' Several commentators
have argued strongly, however, that the intrusion of parens patriae
into the antitrust area is a perversion of the concept.Y2 They believe
that parens patriae actions should be eliminated from the statutory
25 Note, State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits fol
Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 411, 420 (1970).
261d. at 415-17.
27id. at 420.
28 See Malina & Blechman, supra note 15, at 221.
291d.
30 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 401 U.S. 936 (1971).
3 1 State parens patriae treble damage actions currently pending against the Automo-
bile Manufacturers Association will certainly benefit from such a decision. See, e.g,
Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, Civil No. 69 C 5037 (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 17, 1969) (New
York harmed by auto companies' conspiracy not to equip motor vehicles with air polu-
tion control devices); Illinois v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc., Civil No. 69 C 2194 (N.D.
Ill., filed Oct. 25, 1969) (Illinois harmed by auto companies' conspiracy not to equip
motor vehicles with air pollution control devices).
32 See Malina & Blechman, supra note 15, at 223. See also, Handler, The Shift Prom
Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits - The Twenty-Third Annual
Antitrust Review, 71 CoLtnm. L. REv. 1, 12-15 (1971).
